• PRE-REGISTRATION:  If you have it, make the most of it.  Some 5Ks (such as charitable fund-raisers I’ve been in) mail participants their t-shirts/bibs ahead of time.  This saves a LOT of time and should be considered, even if that means raising the price of the event.  Also, don’t make folks sign waivers online and THEN make them sign them on-site.
• I/O:  If this is going to be a large event, have separate parking/entrances/intake systems for volunteers/staff, active participants (e.g., panelists/GOHs), and regular attendees (spectators).  Have the exits be separate from the entrances.   If you make people fill out information on-site upon entering, have enough pens to prevent bottlenecks.
• OPS: Have special staff who are prepared to deal with emergencies, and put them in recognizable outfits so everyone (other staff, volunteers, and the general public) can find them.
• ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS:  Multiple modes are good, especially for announcing changes.  Don’t just rely on emails or FB/Twitter announcements, since folks may miss one or the other due to email spamtraps or not being aware of particular social media channels.  Have a way for participants to communicate with (help) each other to alleviate some of the load on staff.  E.g., publish a Twitter hashtag (and URL for those who aren’t Twitterers) ahead of time — anyone with a smartphone can search on, read, and refresh that in their cars (with someone else driving).  Twitter accounts are only needed to *post* to the hashtag.
• ON-SITE COMMUNICATIONS:  Have a system set up beforehand appropriate to the scale of the event for staff/volunteers communicating with each other (walkie-talkies, radios, or cellphones), and for communicating with crowds.  Have more than one person who knows how to turn off the music and make public safety announcements.
• PUBLIC SAFETY:  Contact police and medical emergency responders ahead of time.  Have a way for injured people at least to be taken back to public transport/parking, not told to walk back, e.g., a golf cart.
• SANITATION:  Have adequate bathroom facilities (even temporary ones) at likely bottlenecks, and make sure supplies are re-stocked.

Case Study:  Run For Your Lives

Run For Your Lives, Camp Ramblewood (Darlington, Maryland), October 22, 2011

This was the inaugural “Zombie 5K” (obstacle course 5K with runners racing through a campground away from zombie actors, the weekend before Halloween).  RFYL announced a few days ahead of time that there were 1000 racers + 10000 spectators signed up (* see comment).  Many people had a great time there.  However, parking problems were not sufficiently prevented, racers were delayed from getting into their planned “waves”, and with darkness approaching and the injuries mounting up (a broken leg, one or two broken clavicles, twisted ankles, etc.), the EMTs had the staff shut down the last wave.  Around 300 of the pre-registered runners had long waits only to find they would be unable to run, with an uncertain refund process (still not announced one day later).   Other event issues contributed to their frustration and disappointment.  In at least one case, lack of planning may have contributed to one runner’s further injury.  This was a first time event for the event runners.  I don’t know if they reached out to anyone more experienced for help planning the event once it became clear how big it was going to be.  They are vowing to listen to all feedback and improve for the next 6 runs they’re planning for next year.  For future participants’ sakes, I hope they do improve.

This is from my personal experience.  A couple of friends and I were signed up for the 3:30 wave of runners, and we got within 6 miles of the event by 2:10 pm.  As we waited to park, I checked RFYL’s Facebook page to see at least two status messages from them with assurances that we’d all still get to run despite the parking delays (they didn’t update their Twitter account).  We were finally parked around 4:45.  We didn’t get to run.  I know I had an incomplete picture, and some parts of the event ran smoothly and well, but these are the issues I saw, and all could have been alleviated with better planning.

1. PARKING:  They knew from registrations how many were coming but had ONE farm field with ONE entrance for parking.  The hay they scattered at the entrance was inadequate to prevent cars getting stuck in the mud, with everyone coming in at the exact same place.  We sat in traffic for 2.5 hours waiting to park because they had posted twice on FB that we’d still all get to race (and they never posted a new update that we wouldn’t all get to race after all, just an apology way after the fact — unless they had said it somewhere down in the hundreds of comments).   Other people had much longer waits, for the same result (not allowed to run).   That’s AFTER getting to Darlington Road, not counting the drive to get to within 5-6 miles of the camp (some drove for 8 hours from out of state, for no joy).   Also, it should have been simple enough to send someone walking up the road to tell the long line of cars waiting to get in, what was going on — not everyone had smartphones to get the (incorrect) information in the Facebook posts, after all!
2. WAITING:  Then we waited in line for the bus, and waited in line for the pathetic bag check (see below), and waited in line to get waiver forms to fill out again (but no pens), and waited in line to get our race packets (where a few people had pens), and waited in line to check our gear (knapsack of clean clothes), and waited in line to start the race.   Some lines were adequately staffed for the size of the event.  Many were not.  Oh yeah, one of the lines  had a poster which mentioned the Twitter hashtag Z5K we should have been told of days ago by RFYL’s own Twitter account, @runfromundead.
3. CONFUSION:  Volunteers/staff wandered by various lines at various times and told 10 of us at a time inconsistent information which we could hardly hear over the booming music (I guess it never occurred to them to make announcements over their own sound system).  The one guy who had a hand-held loudspeaker didn’t know how to use it, rotating his body as he spoke so we could only get one word in 5 as he fanned over our part of the line.  It was hard to tell who were fellow participants trying to help out (passing on rumours), who were volunteers (passing on out of date information?), and who were actual staff (who didn’t seem to agree with each other), beyond the one person in a “STAFF” shirt I saw later.  The shuttles kept bringing folks in from the parking field for a while even after the last wave was cancelled.  Better training, communication systems, and identification systems (even t-shirts) would help with all this.
4. LACK OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING:  When we finally got the semi-official word that there would be no more runner waves and we should head “over there” for refunds, we went to another long line, this one right in front of the horribly loud speakers for the whole field (my friends and I couldn’t hear each other to strategize what to do next, except by screaming).  I went up to the front of the 300+ people waiting for refunds to see what was happening, and saw *two people* slowly (in between long long complaints/vents from folks in line) taking names and zip codes on loose sheets of paper on a rickety card table.  After waiting for some blowhard to finish yelling at the guy on the side with a “STAFF” t-shirt about wanting a parking refund (from the farmer? it was at least 5 solid minutes of wind), I asked the staffer (who looked overwhelmed), “Do all 300 of us really have to wait in line just to give our names?  We all registered online.  Can’t we follow up in email to get our refunds?”  He stared at me for a minute, then grabbed one of the two people at the card table, and they went off in a huddle.  Several folks in line thanked me for suggesting this bit of brilliance (you’re welcome!).  As more staff (?) joined the huddle, I left and updated my friends.  EVENTUALLY someone came by and told us (10 at a time, again, with the music STILL blaring) that we didn’t have to wait in line any more, and could leave.
5. SAFETY:  In addition to the injuries runners suffered, I heard several zombie actors in line waiting to leave discussing being hit, body-checked, screamed at, cursed, and threatened by runners.  Not having been able to run, I don’t know what measures were on hand to prevent fights or provide first aid on the run.  I do know that while we were waiting to enter the event, we saw one poor girl hobbling along in a brand-new ankle cast to get into line for the bus to get back to her car.  Apparently they patched her up and waved her offsite, possibly aggravating her injury in the process.  A golf cart to ferry injured people at least back to the head of the bus line, if not back to their cars, would have been nice AND good business.   Back to the parking lot:  Also, when we tried to leave, someone had abandoned their SUV in such a way as to block the exit, so we had to drive across the field to the entrance to leave.  No one seemed to be doing anything about the abandoned car, much less warning people or using a flag system to show the way to the revised exit (entrance), making everyone’s departure more confused and dangerous.
6. SECURITY:  Why have a bag check at all, if you’re not going to do it right?  We had a soft-sided suitcase with clothes to change into after the race.  At the two card tables at the entrance, the two people per table  sort of looked at bag contents — not opening all compartments, and certainly not examining individual items, e.g., my friend’s boots in the bag.  Lots of questionable items could have been snuck in by anyone, as far as I could tell.   Also, had our refund line broken into a riot (things were getting really ugly in some parts of the line, with folks having driven from two or three states away practically losing it and getting each other worked up), there did not seem to be any contingency in place for this.

Positive aspects:  As I said, many folks had a lot of fun.  The staff and volunteers remained pretty polite under a lot of pressure.   As we were walking back to our field parking lot 2 miles away (the bus line was long and I was antsy), a zombie volunteer we’d been chatting with was kind enough to offer to chase us when we weren’t too far off, so she went RAARRRRR!!!!! and we ran and screamed for a few hundred feet as she chased us back to the field entrance, and that was fun.  Too bad we couldn’t experience the whole run, but it did get the adrenalin going and give me an extra push, and I bet I might have enjoyed the event.

1. No obvious paper ballot alternative to electronic voting. When I was checking in, I was not asked about my voting preference. The courteous volunteer escorted me directly to an electronic voting station, with no mention of alternatives. There may have been something about an option on the posters on the wall, but I was in a hurry, as I’m sure many other voters are.
2. As soon as I stuck my ballot card in the machine, it said I had voted already. Fortunately the volunteer who had escorted me to my station had only moved a few steps away in the direction of other voters, so when I called her back, she believed me when I protested I hadn’t had time to vote yet.
3. Even when my voting issue was taken seriously by the judges, no one mentioned a paper ballot as an alternative (it was resolved with the help of another (more senior?) judge, by the issue of another ballot; I hope my vote actually was counted).

So, I continue to see issues with electronic voting in Maryland which do not inspire me with confidence in our electronic voting system — and the problems I encountered may not have been the worst.  I have no issue with the people who volunteer to be judges and thank them all for their service!  I just wish we had a better system for them to administer.

However, at the training, I got my first crack at actually trying out the electronic pollbooks (Diebold machines where one checks to see if a prospective voter is registered in the district in which one is working). That interface is in serious need of improvement. For instance, when searching by address, it goes from saying “TOO MANY” (type in more letters to narrow), to listing only one name when the first digit of the house number is typed in, to “NOT FOUND IN STATE” when only some house numbers are typed in, to finally listing the selections again when all house numbers have been typed in. It seems likely that would-be voters will be turned away (or made to vote provisionally) erroneously, given the potential for confusion in the path for getting to their listings.

The Maryland primary / election was held Feb. 12, and I was a Closing Judge for it.

I was already aware of some potential issues with electronic voting from previous reading (e.g., vendor systems being certified that should not have been, by the given states’ own standards). The training had reinforced my concern that human factors with all the complicated steps (including paperwork) required by these so-called paperless machines would make it difficult to pass an audit at an average Maryland precinct, were anyone in Maryland auditing the election process at the precincts (see previous entry linked above, regarding CM and audits). I was committed to do my best to follow the procedures as best I could, though. I was not expecting the problem of a Chief Judge not following procedure, but that is what happened at my precinct. Now, they’d already been at the polls since 6 am when we got word around 7:25 pm, that the elections were being extended until 9:30 (due to weather). So I understand the confusion and the desire to hurry. Unfortunately, one of the Chief Judges started closing up the voting units with an assistant judge from his own party. We got the other Chief Judge to have a discussion with him and got back on track, more or less, though we couldn’t roll the clock back on that one machine.

I sent email to the Board of Elections and got a positive response back for how we’d handled it, saying they would clarify the training. I’m still concerned with this mistake from one of the Chief Judges — they were supposed to be the most familiar with the procedural requirements, after all. I don’t see how the process can be simplified much, given the electronic voting technology we’re using. I want a voting system at least as secure as paper ballots, and we don’t have that now.

Here are links to a couple of write-ups by another Maryland election judge, Avi Rubin, who is a computer security expert. He links to concerns about the voting units themselves (and the software on them) , and others have documented concerns about the tabulation, but his entries below explain simpler concerns with physical security (without which, the electronic systems are even more vulnerable to accidental or deliberate tampering). Like him, I think all the people with whom I served were trying to do an honest job — but there are documented cases of election tampering in our country’s history, even by election officials, and it would be reckless to assume “it can’t happen here”, or “it’ll never happen again”.

• 2006 primary: Tamper tape and other physical vulnerabilities
• 2008 training

Note the emphasis on auditing the process there, not just the software. If one wants to know how well a process involving software works, it’s not enough just to look at the software, especially when one wants to be really, really sure about the process. What controls are in place to make sure that the right software is being used? Even assuming good faith, mistakes can happen, especially if one is in a rush to deploy a bug fix. Are there other elements that need controls, such as hardware elements … data devices that may be moved around, such as cards? Are all these elements uniquely identifiable? What logging is in place to be able to check that the controls are working? How accident- and tamper-resistant are the logs?

The more complex a system is, the more difficult it is to ensure that everything is functioning as expected. Electronic voting systems are complex, and it’s not just about the software. Others have written about specific issues with specific elections in the past, machines that were certified that never should have been, and so on. Some electronic voting critics have acted as election judges to get a first-hand look (particularly after counter-claims involving ivory towers and lab conditions), and have written about their experiences.

I wanted to help out with elections this year, and get a closer look at what I’d read about. I went to my first Election Judge training last week, to be a Closing Judge for Montgomery County (Maryland) last week. The trainers did their best with us in two hours, but I’m going to just have to hope I get things right, with the help of the Chief Judge and more experienced judges there (we have a meeting at my precinct Monday night). It didn’t help that the trainers did not follow our written documentation (they explained they were skipping stuff because they knew the system cold, and we had to get done in time to clear the room for the next class), and did not always agree with each other about the training machines. Whatever Diebold had under the covers, the elements we were working with (tape, data cards, keys, printouts that had to be torn at just the right time or that machine’s results were invalidated, etc.) were complex enough that, given our insufficient training, it’s hard to see how we could pass an audit next week. I’m not blaming the trainers — there was too much to cover. Electronic voting (as opposed to using machines to fill out and print out the actual ballots to be counting) is complicated, and that complexity makes it difficult to maintain a secure voting process. I want a voting system at least as secure as good old paper ballots. We don’t have that right now.